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Abstract Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) purport to show that robust
moral realism, the metaethical view that there are non-natural and mind-independent
moral properties and facts that we can know about, is incompatible with evolutionary
explanations of morality. One of the most prominent evolutionary debunking argu-
ments is advanced by Sharon Street, who argues that if moral realism were true, then
objective moral knowledge is unlikely because realist moral properties are evolution-
ary irrelevant and moral beliefs about those properties would not be selected for.
However, no evolutionary, causal explanation plays an essential role in reaching the
argument’s epistemological conclusion. Street’s argument depends on the Benacerraf-
Field challenge, which is the challenge to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs
about causally inert moral properties. The Benacerraf-Field challenge relies on meta-
physically necessary facts about realist moral properties, rather than on contingent
Darwinian facts about the origin of our moral beliefs. Attempting to include an
essential causal empirical premise yet avoiding recourse to the Benacerraf-Field
problem yields an argument that is either self-defeating or of limited scope. Ultimate-
ly, evolutionary, causal explanations of our moral beliefs and their consequences do
not present the strongest case against robust moral realism. Rather, the question is
whether knowledge of casually-inert, mind-intendent properties is plausible at all.
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1 Introduction1
1.1 Background
Much current metaethical research focuses on the consequences of the assumption that
evolutionary forces shaped our moral cognition. If moral cognition is an adaption, then our
capacity to produce moral judgements, and, to some extent, the content of our moral
judgements and beliefs are the products of natural selection (Street 2006: 115–121; Joyce
2006: chapter 4).2 While there are considerable difficulties in establishing this claim, there are
also persuasive arguments in its favour (Fraser 2014; Buchanan and Powell 2015; Kitcher
2011: 17–166).
Some proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments3 purport to show that robust moral
realism4 (the view that there are non-natural and mind-independent moral properties and facts
about which we can have knowledge) is inconsistent with the evolutionary influence on our
moral cognition, and so should be rejected (Street 2006; Ruse and Wilson 2006).5 These
debunkers reach epistemological conclusions by taking into accountDarwinian considerations
about the origins of our moral beliefs. The grand ambition of debunkers is to use a well-
established empirical account of the origins of our moral beliefs to discredit moral realism. The
argumentative strategy is intriguing: evolutionary theory seems correct, and it would be an
immense cost to any metaethical theory if it could not incorporate it. Sharon Street put forward
the most influential evolution-based critique.
Street reaches the sceptical epistemological conclusion that we have sufficient reason to doubt
the truth of all of our moral beliefs and suggests that Darwinian considerations do important work
in the argument (Street 2006: 109) and, eventually, ‘settle the [realism vs. anti-realism] debate in
favour of the anti-realist view’ (Street 2008a: 214). She argues that if robust moral realism were
true, then moral knowledge is unlikely because mind-independent moral properties were evolu-
tionary irrelevant and thus beliefs about these properties were not selected for.
An ever increasing number of writers are concerned with the metaethical implications of
evolutionary theory, suggesting that much in metaethics depends on one or the other expla-
nation of the causal origins of our moral beliefs (e.g. Ruse and Richards forthcoming; Artiga
2015; Deem 2016; Fraser 2014).
1 For helpful comments on this paper I thank Liam Deane,Hein Duijf, Jonathan Goodman, Wouter Kalf, Herman
Philipse, Hanno Sauer, Joeri Witteveen, and two anonymous referees of this journal. Thanks also to audiences at
the 4th Annual Conference of the Colombian Philosophy Society, the Objectivity in Ethics conference in Utrecht,
the Science vs Common Sense conference in Amsterdam, and the European Epistemology Network Annual
Meeting 2016.
2 The distinction between the capacity to make moral judgements and their content is crucial for EDAs in
metaethics, and it is controversial whether the empirical claim about evolutionary influences on the content of our
moral beliefs is well-supported (e.g. FitzPatrick 2015; Mogensen 2016; Buchanan and Powell 2015). I assume it
here for the sake of the present discussion.
3 I focus on Street’s global EDA that intends to lower the status of all moral judgements (Kahane 2011).
4 Henceforth ‘realism’ designates robust moral realism. ‘Moral properties’ entail ‘moral facts’. Exemplary
proponents are Enoch (2011), Shafer-Landau (2003), and Wielenberg (2014). Street means to include moral
naturalism as a target of the EDA, too, and while most see moral naturalism well placed to answer the
evolutionary challenge (e.g. Enoch 2010: 422), others have recently called this into question (Barkhausen
2016; Bogardus 2016).
5 Not all areas of discourse are threatened by evolutionary considerations. For example, the truth of our beliefs
about ordinary objects is consistent with their purported evolutionary background (Wilkins and Griffiths 2013;
Boudry and Vlerick 2014).
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1.2 Argument and Relevance
Street’s argument against robust moral realism depends on a version of the Benacerraf-Field
challenge, according to which moral realists must show that it is in principle possible to
explain how we can have reliable beliefs about the moral properties postulated by moral
realism. The Benacerraf-Field challenge does not rely on a premise about human evolution, or
any alternative empirical explanation of the origins of our moral beliefs. Hence, contrary to the
received view, no evolutionary causal explanation plays an essential role in reaching the
debunking argument’s epistemological conclusion.
But attempts to include an essential empirical premise about the origins of our
moral beliefs, while not relying on a version of the Benacerraf-Field challenge, do not
succeed: the EDA would be self-defeating if applied to all moral beliefs, or it would
debunk only some of our moral beliefs, but not all of them. Hence, Street’s evolu-
tionary, causal debunking argument against robust moral realism fails.
This should alter the locus of the metaethical debunking debate. The crucial point
is not what follows from evolutionary theory or alternative causal explanations of our
moral beliefs, but whether knowledge of causally-inert, mind-independent, and irre-
ducibly normative properties is possible at all.
1.3 Structure
I proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces Street’s EDA and presents a possible escape route for
robust realists, which highlights a crucial premise of the EDA. Section 3 shows that this crucial
premise is conceptual rather than empirical and that the argument depends on the Benacerraf-
Field challenge. Section 4 argues that attempts to reintroduce an essential empirical premise fail.
2 Street’s Evolutionary Debunking Argument and an Escape Route
for Realists
2.1 Street’s EDA
The first premise of Street’s argument is the supposition, for the sake of argument, that robust
moral realism is true (Street 2006: 109, 121).
REALISM: Robust moral realism is true.
Evolutionary debunking arguments generally rest on claims about our moral beliefs,
typically about their origins. The factual premises of the argument – claims about our moral
beliefs – provide the grounds for the ‘debunking premise,’ which states the reason(s) for
viewing with suspicion the facts about our moral beliefs that were established by the factual
premises (Kahane 2011). Thus, the factual premises need to be combined with a debunking
premise to yield a conclusion.
What are Street’s ‘factual’ premises? Almost all discussions of her argument (e.g. Copp 2008;
Vavova 2015; Artiga 2015) follow Street in interpreting her first factual premise as stating that
natural selection, and other evolutionary factors, have had a ‘tremendous,' albeit indirect,
influence on the content of human evaluative attitudes (Street 2006: 113). However, a careful
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reading shows that Street is, somewhat in tension with the tenor of her piece, not committed
exclusively to evolutionary factors: she also mentions that ‘other causal influences can shape our
evaluative judgements’ (Street 2006: 120), and as long as there is ‘some sort of causal explana-
tion’ (Street 2006: 153) of our evaluative beliefs, ‘whether Darwinian or otherwise’ (Street 2006:
155), this fact seems sufficient ‘for the purposes of the argument’ (Street 2006: 158). Hence,
Street’s challenge is best understood if her first factual premise is construed as making a broad
claim about the causal origins of our moral beliefs. Let’s call this premise INFLUENCE6:
INFLUENCE: All our moral beliefs were influenced by causal forces.
Street argues that the causal forces that shaped our moral beliefs are not systematically
connected to moral truths and argues the realist must ‘take a position on what relation there is, if
any, between the selective forces that have influenced the content of our evaluative judgements
[…] and the independent evaluative truths that realism posits’ (Street 2006: 121). One option is
to assume that there is no connection between the causal forces that influenced our basic
evaluative dispositions and the moral truth. The other option is to affirm that there is such a
connection. The latter option is rejected by most realists (FitzPatrick 2014: 241).7 Hence, the
second factual, empirical premise in Street’s argument is about the independence of causal
influences on our moral beliefs and the moral truth. Let’s call this premise MISLEAD:
MISLEAD: The causal forces that influenced our moral beliefs have no systematic relation to
the moral truth.
Street argues that REALISM, INFLUENCE, and MISLEAD lead to a sceptical conclusion (Street
2006: 122). We can fill in the required DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL:
DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL8: If REALISM, INFLUENCE, and MISLEAD are true, then we have
sufficient reason to doubt the truth of all our moral beliefs.
DOUBT (conclusion)9: So, we have sufficient reason to doubt the truth of all our
moral beliefs. (from REALISM, INFLUENCE, MISLEAD, and
DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL).
The independence of evaluative truths and the causal origins of our moral beliefs bodes
trouble for realism. Intriguingly, the argument seems to have sweeping metaethical
6 Vavova (2014, 2015) uses the same term but refers to evolutionary forces exclusively.
7 Assuming that there is a connection between evolutionary forces and moral truth confronts realists with an
inference to the best explanation (IBE): the content of our moral beliefs can be explained without invokingmoral
properties. Qua parsimony, the evolutionary explanation is better than the realist’s explanation. I do not consider
the ‘EDA as IBE‘interpretation here since it would leave much room for the realists to reply. They might claim,
for instance, that there are further, prudential reasons to stick with realism (Enoch 2011; Copp 2008: 190).
8 The epistemic principle behind the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL is controversial and a crucial point of the
debunking debate (cf. Bedke 2014; Bogardus 2016; Vavova 2015). I assess two interpretations in Section 3.3,
to support my point about the irrelevance of genealogical claims, but I do not address the debate about the correct
epistemic principle in this paper.
9 Street’s argument extends beyond DOUBT: she concludes that robust realism ought to be rejected (Street 2006:
135). I am sympathetic to Vavova’s interpretation of the argument as the ‘beginning of a reductio of realism’
(Vavova 2015: 108). This makes sense if we make explicit that REALISM entails the possibility of moral
knowledge, and an auxiliary premise that states that a metaethical theory ought to be rejected if it both entails
that moral knowledge is possible and at the same time gives us reason to doubt the truth of all our moral beliefs.
My argument focuses on the steps that lead to DOUBT, so I need not make the additional steps towards the
rejection of realism explicit.
Klenk M.
implications based on empirical evidence. If debunkers could thereby challenge robust moral
realism, they would change our concept of ‘man’s position in the universe’ through reference
to solid empirical facts – truly in ‘Darwin’s spirit’ (Mayr 2003: xxi).
2.2 An Escape Route for Realists
However, thus far the argument does not secure a sceptical conclusion as it ignores an
easily overlooked complication. Since we assume REALISM, moral properties do exist,
and at least some of our moral beliefs could, in principle, reliably track them (cf.
FitzPatrick 2015; Huemer 2016; Wielenberg 2014). This would be enough to reject
the claim that empirical evidence about the origins of our beliefs gives us sufficient
reason to doubt the truth of all of our moral beliefs. Thus, realists might grant
REALISM, INFLUENCE and MISLEAD, but reject the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL. Realists
might argue:
CORRECT: At least some of our moral beliefs are likely to track
realist moral properties.10
ANTI-DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL: If REALISM and CORRECT are true then we do not have
sufficient reason to doubt the truth of all our moral
beliefs.
TRUST (conclusion): So, we do not have sufficient reason to doubt the truth of
all our moral beliefs. (from REALISM, CORRECT, and ANTI-
DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL).
We can infer TRUST from CORRECT and the ANTI-DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL since
CORRECT gives us reason to believe that at least some of our moral beliefs are non-
accidentally connected to the moral properties. The DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL and the
ANTI-DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL cannot both be true, but which premise realists have to
accept depends on whether INFLUENCE and MISLEAD rule out CORRECT.
As mentioned above, the realists this paper is concerned with are committed to a non-
naturalistic conception of mind-independent, causally-inert moral properties (e.g. Enoch
2011: 7, 159; Shafer-Landau 2003: 107).11 This suggests that their claim to CORRECT is
unaffected by INFLUENCE and MISLEAD because realists’ accounts of how moral believers
track moral properties do not rely on causal relations between moral properties and moral
beliefs in the first place. Whether we believe that stealing is wrong, for instance, because
of some Darwinian force, or because of our upbringing, or because of some other causal
factor, realists can hold on to the claim that the belief is non-accidentally true because
debunkers have not ruled out realists’ non-causal accounts of reliable access to its truth.12
How do realists defend the claim that our moral beliefs are likely to track realist moral
properties? They might claim, for instance, that moral beliefs are reliably formed through
rational intuition or direct perception, or that there is a constitutive relation between moral
10 The notion of ‘tracking’ as I use it in this paper should be broadly understood as capturing any non-accidental,
systematic connection between our moral beliefs and realist moral properties.
11 There are realists who claim that moral properties are causally efficacious. For example, Oddie (2009) and the
Cornell realists. It is worth repeating that I am solely concerned with Street’s EDA as it applies to robust moral
realism, which entails that moral properties are causally inert.
12 Vavova (2015) suggests that the empirical premises alone suffice to rule out CORRECT, if they provide evidence
of error. I show that this route fails in Section 4.
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properties and moral beliefs, or that divine revelation plays a role in shaping our moral
beliefs (cf. Bogardus 2016: 642f; Bengson 2015; Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014;
Huemer 2016: 1987–1989).13
Hence, debunkers have to consider CORRECT as a live option and realists would likely insist
that, in an argument that begins with REALISM, debunkers first have to show that the realist’s
‘escape route’ via CORRECT fails.
Debunkers have two options. They can reject CORRECT, which requires showing that none
of our moral beliefs is likely to track moral properties. If successful, they could infer DOUBT.
Alternatively, as we will see, they may argue that the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL, and the
inference to DOUBT, are valid despite CORRECT.
3 Street’s Debunking Argument Relies on the Benacerraf-Field Challenge
3.1 The Benacerraf Field Challenge
Note that debunkers cannot just assume without argument that CORRECT is false because that
would beg the question in the argument against realism. As indicated above, their empirical
premises do not directly refute CORRECT either. Therefore, debunkers need a different argument
to show that CORRECT fails; such an argument depends on the Benacerraf-Field challenge.
The Benacerraf-Field challenge is a problem for knowledge of mind-independent, causally
inert entities. The worry originates in Benacerraf’s work on the possibility of mathematical
knowledge (Benacerraf 1973). He writes:
‘[…] I think, that something must be said to bridge the chasm, created by… [a] realistic
and platonistic interpretation of mathematical propositions, between the entities that
form the subject matter of mathematics and the human knower.’ (Benacerraf 1973: 675)
The abstract entities postulated by mathematical Platonism share two important features
with moral properties: mind-independence and causal inertness. Therefore, as Peacocke
recognises, Benacerraf’s problem concerning mathematical Platonism seems to be a problem
for moral realism, too:
‘What Benacerraf [...] asserts about mathematical truth applies to any subject matter. The
concept of truth, as it is explicated for any given subject matter, must fit into an overall
account of knowledge in a way that makes it intelligible how we have the knowledge in
that domain that we do have. (Peacocke 1999: 1-2)
Benacerraf’s worry presupposes a causal theory of knowledge, but Harty Field’s development
of the challenge makes it independent of this precondition. Thus it also applies to robust moral
realists, who commonly reject a causal theory of knowledge. Field challenges realists to explain:
‘[…] how our beliefs about [abstract] entities can so well reflect the facts about them [...]
[I]f it appears in principle impossible to explain this, then that tends to undermine the
13 I do not address the merits of possible realist replies in this paper. My sole concern here is to show that the
debunking argument depends on the Benacerraf-Field challenge. I am sceptical about the ultimate viability of the
mentioned realist replies, but my point here is simply that they are live options and not ruled out by the empirical
premises of the argument, which is why debunkers rely on the Benacerraf-Field challenge counter these claims.
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belief in mathematical entities, despite whatever reason we might have for believing in
them ‘ (Field 1989: 26).
Field’s adapted challenge ‘[…] depends on the idea that we should view with suspicion any
claim to know facts about a certain domain if we believe it impossible in principle to explain
the reliability of our beliefs about that domain’ (Field 1989: 232–233). The Benacerraf-Field
challenge raises suspicion about the reliability of beliefs about causally inert and mind-
independent properties. This is problematic because it is, other things being equal, a cost of
a theory if it treats knowledge about properties presupposed by the theory as merely accidental
or altogether inexplicable. We can now see that the Benacerraf-Field arises because of the
metaphysical properties of abstract entities and that moral properties are relevantly similar
because they are also mind-independent and causally inert. If there is no way in which robust
realists can explain how our moral beliefs are likely to track realist moral properties (i.e. give
an argument for CORRECT), then moral knowledge would indeed be a startling fact.
3.2 Benacerraf-Field 2 - Darwin 0
The Benacerraf-Field challenge affords a way to argue that it is likely that none of our moral
beliefs can reliably track mind-independent and causally inert moral properties (cf. Clarke-
Doane 2017). In other words, Benacerraf and Field allege that the nature of moral properties
makes it likely that CORRECT is false. If their allegation is correct, then we have reason to
accept the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL and not the ANTI-DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL.14
Debunkers rely on the Benacerraf-Field challenge to reject CORRECT and to force realists to
accept the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL. This is because the empirical claims of the debunking
argument leave open the possibility of non-causal, truth-tracking determinants of our moral
beliefs and so CORRECT is not falsified (cf. Bogardus 2016). Conversely, if realists could
vindicate CORRECT, we would have reason to accept the claim that we do not have sufficient
reason to doubt the truth of all our moral beliefs. Debunkers have to challenge realists, in
Benacerraf’s and Field’s spirit, to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs to get their
sceptical argument off the ground.
Importantly, the Benacerraf-Field challenge is a conceptual, normative challenge. It is
conceptual because it relies on the epistemological suspicion that knowledge of mind-inde-
pendent, causally inert moral properties is inexplicable,15 and it is normative because it
demands that proponents of such properties explain how our beliefs about these properties
could be reliable. Debunkers rely on it in their argument against robust moral realism.
Therefore, empirical, causal considerations, as in INFLUENCE or MISLEAD, are not sufficient
to reach a sceptical conclusion against robust moral realism. The empirical debunking
argument turns out to rely on a conceptual, normative claim that is based on the metaphysical
nature of moral properties.
In addition, it seems that the reliance on the Benacerraf-Field challenge makes the empirical
premises of the debunking argument redundant, too. Once the Benacerraf-Field challenge
establishes that none of our moral beliefs are likely to trackmoral properties (hence, that CORRECT
is false), the empirical premises INFLUENCE and MISLEAD do not provide any additional sceptical
14 This paper does not assess how the Benacerraf-Field challenge fares against CORRECT. Clarke-Doane (2017)
and, in parts, Bogardus (2016) address this issue.
15 The precise epistemic principles behind the Benacerraf-Field challenge are controversial, cf. Clarke-Doane
(2017).
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oomph: blocking the realist’s escape route via CORRECT would already secure the sceptical
conclusion that we have sufficient reason to doubt the truth of all our moral beliefs.
Debunkers might object: even though the empirical premises, INFLUENCE and
MISLEAD, are not sufficient to reach the sceptical conclusion, they seem to provide
additional reason to doubt realism. Let us consider an example to make the objection
vivid and then see how it can be answered16:
Case 1: Suppose that Alf ingests an anti-maths drug which makes his mathematical
beliefs unreliable; this gives him sufficient reason to doubt the truth of his mathematical
beliefs.
Case 2: Mathematical objects are causally inert, they cannot influence our mathematical
beliefs; this, too, gives Alf sufficient reason to doubt the truth of his mathematical beliefs.
Although case 1) and 2) lead to the same conclusion, they cannot thereby be reduced to
one another. Case 1 givesAlf additional reason to doubt the truth of his mathematical beliefs.
The anti-maths drug case resembles the empirical, causal debunking argument: the evidence
about Alf ingesting the drug seems roughly analogous to the empirical claim about the causal
origins of our beliefs. Clearly, this gives us additional reason to be sceptical about Alf’s maths-
beliefs.
However, the anti-maths drug case is different from the debunking of moral realism. In the
case of the anti-maths drug, we might legitimately stipulate that there is no way for Alf to have at
least some reliable true maths beliefs: we just assume that the anti-maths drug rules out this
possibility. However, this stipulation cannot be made in the causal debunking argument, since
debunkers cannot presuppose that it is impossible for realists to fine-tune their moral beliefs
without begging the question. Instead, debunkers need to argue for it, and they rely on the causal
inertness and mind-independence of moral properties to fashion an argument to that effect. This,
we have seen, is a version of the Benacerraf-Field challenge. Hence, even though the sceptical
conclusions of the maths-belief cases above are independent, and the sceptical oomph that they
provide is additive, the empirical debunking argument against realism is not independent of the
conceptual argument. To the contrary, reaching the conclusion of the empirical argument depends
on the conceptual argument against CORRECT. So, in contrast to the maths-case, to pose the
empirical debunking argument requires a successful conceptual debunking argument – and it is
doubtful whether the empirical debunking argument would give us any additional reason in any
interesting sense since realists would have had to concede defeat already.
More specifically, the sense in which the sceptical conclusion of the empirical causal
debunking argument is additive, that is, giving us additional reason to be sceptical about
realism, is additive only in the weak sense in which the following italicised variants of
INFLUENCE give us additional reason to doubt the truth of specific realist moral beliefs:
Case 3: Anton believes that donating to charities is good, not because the belief is reliable
and true, but because he heard his neighbour say it.
Case 4: Bob believes that eating animals is wrong, not because the belief is reliable and
true, but because he was moved by the cover of Peter Singer’s ‘Animal Liberation’.
Case 5: Cliff believes that gender equality is just, not because the belief is reliable and
true, but because he has an evolved fairness sense.
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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These particular instances of INFLUENCE surely seem spurious, and the impression created
by Singer’s book cover, for example, is in itself not a good indicator of the truth about animal
ethics. But if we knew that Bob studied the book’s content and, as a robust realist sympathetic
to Singer’s view would claim, thereby formed reliable beliefs about the truth on animal ethics,
we should conclude that doubting Bob’s belief is unwarranted. Given the realist’s commitment
to non-causal explanations of moral knowledge, the evidence about the actual causal origins of
Anton’s, Bob’s, and Cliff’s beliefs are not, in themselves, troubling. It may raise our suspicion,
but it cannot justify our suspicion if we have not ruled out their truth-tracking ability first.
What debunkers need is the claim that Anton, Bob, and Cliff are unlikely to believe what they
believe because it is true. However, once debunkers secure that point, we need not worry about
the actual causal origins of our beliefs anymore. Realists would already be in deep trouble if
their explanation of non-causal, nonetheless reliable belief-forming methods failed; additional
genealogical considerations would not worsen the problem for robust realists.
Hence, there are good reasons to think that the empirical premises, and the DEBUNKING
CONDITIONAL, do not suffice to debunk moral realism, and also that adding the empirical
premises does not add problems for robust realism.
3.3 Empirical Premises are not Required
Perhaps, however, debunkers might think that their empirical premises are necessary to reject
CORRECT. Two prominent interpretations of the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL, suggested by Street
(2006) and taken up in the literature, suggest that they are not. The mind-independence and
causal inertness of moral properties is doing all the work.
First, many have suggested that the debunking premise rests on probabilistic considerations.
In the words of Shafer-Landau, the odds of adopting a true moral belief are low because ‘our
actual moral beliefs represent only a small portion of all possible moral beliefs’ (Shafer-
Landau 2012). It makes sense to interpret Street’s evolutionary debunking argument as an
argument that invokes probability, particularly when she writes:
‘Of course it’s possible that as a matter of sheer chance, some large portion of our
evaluative judgements ended up true, due to a happy coincidence between the realist’s
independent evaluative truths and the evaluative directions in which natural selection
tended to push us, but this would require a fluke of luck that’s not only extremely
unlikely, in view of the huge universe of logically possible evaluative judgements and
truths, but also astoundingly convenient to the realist.’ (Street 2006: 122)17
The assumed fact that illegitimate forces had an impact on our moral beliefs is taken to
imply that our actual moral belief system has only a slight chance of matching the correct
moral belief system. Street concludes that many of our actual moral beliefs are likely to be ‘off
track’ (Street 2008b: 208). On this interpretation, the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL is motivated by
alluding to the conceptual possibility of there being many different possible moral belief
systems but no way of discriminating the correct moral belief system. Thus, the low proba-
bility of adopting just the right moral belief system amongst countless false moral belief
systems is sufficient reason to doubt the truth of our moral beliefs. However, for the claim that
we are unable to identify the correct moral beliefs system to be convincing, we have to assume
that CORRECT has faltered. Hence:
17 See also Street (2008b: 208) and Street (2011: 14).
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LOW PROBABILITY: If REALISM is true and CORRECT is false, then there are many
conceptually possible moral belief systems and no way of telling
whether the one we currently adopted is the correct one.
LP-DEBUNKING COND.: If LOW PROBABILITY is true, then we have sufficient reason to
doubt the truth of all our moral beliefs.
Others interpret the argument’s debunking claim as depending on considerations
about counterfactuals. This interpretation is formulated most clearly by Clarke-Doane
(2012). He argues that the debunking premise of the argument is substantiated by the
following conditional:
‘[…] if our moral beliefs were the products of evolutionary forces, then those forces would
be ‘non-truth-tracking’—that is, [..] if we were selected to have certain moral beliefs at all,
then we would not be selected to have true moral beliefs’ (Clarke-Doane 2012: 325).
This would create a problem for robust moral realism because ‘if we were not selected to
have true moral beliefs, then had the moral truths been very different, our moral beliefs would
have been the same’ (Clarke-Doane 2012: 319). The essence of Clarke-Doane’s understanding
of the debunking premise is the claim that our moral beliefs are the products of ‘non-truth-
tracking’ forces. However, Clarke-Doane’s counterfactual also depends on the claim that non-
causal determinants of our moral beliefs cannot play a role; hence that CORRECT is false:
COUNTERFACTUAL: If REALISM is true and CORRECT is false, then we would still have
the same moral beliefs even if the moral truths would be different.
C-DEBUNKING COND.: IF COUNTERFACTUAL is true, then we have sufficient reason to doubt
the truth of all our moral beliefs.
Both interpretations of Street’s DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL seem plausible. Both could be
used to infer a version of DOUBT. However, these interpretations do not require an empirical
claim about the origins of our moral beliefs to be convincing. Rather, they depend on the
conceptual claim that moral properties are similar to the properties of abstract entities, in that
they are causally inert and mind-independent. If it were not for this fact, neither interpretation
would have much bite. Consider LOW PROBABILITY. Our inability to tell whether our current
moral belief system is the one that matches the facts depends on (the conceptual possibility of)
our beliefs being insensitive to the moral properties. That, in turn, depends on the moral
properties being mind-independent and causally inert. Consider COUNTERFACTUAL. Our moral
beliefs would be insensitive to changes in the moral truth only if the moral properties, which
constitute the moral truth, are mind-independent and causally inert.
Therefore, both interpretations of the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL require the same observa-
tion about the nature of moral properties to be convincing, which is, as we have seen, not an
observation of any contingent empirical fact, but of necessary metaphysical facts.
Recent discussions of Street’s debunking argument frequently miss this point. Bogardus,
for instance, looks into the epistemic principle that underlies the argument, which indeed is a
key question, but then expects, mistakenly, that it somehow needs to combine with ‘the facts of
evolution’ to create a sceptical conclusion (Bogardus 2016: 636). Vavova claims that the
argument rests on a claim about evolutionary influences, but does not emphasise that this is the
case only if CORRECT is rejected (Vavova 2015: 108). Referring to Street (2006), Artiga (2015)
and Deem (2016) defend elaborate empirical hypotheses about the compatibility of particular
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causal explanations of our moral beliefs and moral realism, ignoring that the issue with
CORRECT cannot be settled by any causal explanation.
When the crucial nature of moral properties is noted, for instance by Bedke (2014) who
refers to the moral beliefs being ‘oblivious’ to the moral properties or by Crow (2015), then it
is too often overlooked that no causal claim of any kind is required to make the argument
work. Similarly, Clarke-Doane (2012) observes, in line with Street (2006), that the particular
details of the causal history are irrelevant, but he does not argue that no causal claim is needed
for the argument (Clarke-Doane 2012: 326). Enoch suggests that the core issue is to explain
the correlation between the moral beliefs that we take to be true and realist moral properties,
which resembles the Benacerraf-Field challenge (Enoch 2010: 421). But still, his answer to the
challenge involves a causal explanation of our moral beliefs, which wrongly suggests that the
causal history of our moral beliefs, and competing elucidations of it, are indeed the problem
that underpins the debunking argument. Framing the issue like this is misleading as it puts too
much emphasis on one or the other interpretation of the causal origins of our moral beliefs, on
the soundness of such explanations, or on the seemingly extraordinary fact that we can
illuminate the causal background of our moral beliefs. The crucial fact is, as we have seen,
that the nature of moral properties puts the realist’s claim to CORRECT in jeopardy.
The interpretations of Street’s DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL considered here support the
conclusion that the debunking argument relies on the Benacerraf-Field challenge and,
conversely, on conceptual claims about the nature of realist moral properties. This
does not show that any debunking argument that leads to DOUBT relies on a concep-
tual argument against CORRECT rather than on INFLUENCE and MISLEAD. However, the
above already gives us strong reasons to suppose that the causal inertness and mind-
independence of moral properties (and the resulting conceptual, epistemic problem) lie
at the heart of other supposed causal debunking arguments against robust moral
realism, too. The alleged Darwinian debunking argument contains the spirit of Bena-
cerraf and Field, but not that of Darwin.
3.4 Intermediate Conclusion
Street’s evolutionary debunking argument, an apparently empirically-informed argument against
realism, turns out to rest on the conceptual claim that moral properties are mind-independent and
causally inert and that this makes reliably true moral beliefs unlikely. The latter observation
‘crowds out’ empirical considerations from the factual premises of the argument.
Debunkers should be wary in accepting this conclusion. Although the Benacerraf-Field
challenge appears to be a powerful epistemological challenge against robust moral realism, it
fails to constitute an argument against realism that is based on an empirical premise about the
causal origins of our moral beliefs. Debunking arguments would be misleading without an
empirical premise because the argument would render empirical premises redundant to making
the argument sound.
4 Street’s EDA does not Succeed without the Benacerraf-Field Challenge
Debunkers might concede that one strategy against CORRECT relies on the Benacerraf-Field
challenge, but argue that another route shows how variants of the empirical premises INFLUENCE
and MISLEAD can force realists to accept the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL without a conceptual
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argument against CORRECT. This is how the debunking argument is often understood, and this
section will attempt to dispel this myth.
The myth is this: that debunking arguments provide us with evidence that most or even all
of our moral beliefs are influenced by such-and-such causal processes; and we see that some of
these beliefs are false. Hence, since we know about the pervasive influence of causal forces on
our beliefs and the occasional distorting effect, we can infer that we should be sceptical about
the truth of all our moral beliefs; they do not seem to track moral properties, despite the
possible corrective influence of the non-causal relations postulated by robust realists.18 So, the
myth goes, realism is debunked without relying on a version of the Benacerraf-Field challenge.
Why do debunkers need a substantive moral claim? Because to show that causal influences
are distorting, without relying on the claim19 that ‘causal influences were the only possible
determinants of our moral beliefs,’ requires evidence that our beliefs are distorted despite
possible alternative, non-causal determinants of our beliefs (like those the realists claim exist).
The required evidence can only be provided by showing that the causal influences in question
lead us to have false moral beliefs, and to determine that we have false moral beliefs debunkers
need to commit to substantive moral claims about which moral beliefs are false.
However, assuming the truth of substantive moral claims is problematic in an argument that
raises doubt about the truth of all our moral beliefs. Such a ‘global’ debunking argument
would call these very assumptions into question.20 Put another way, an inductive argument
supporting the DEBUNKING CONDITIONAL would cast considerable doubt on the truth of all of
our moral beliefs. However, in that case, we would also have reason to doubt the truth of the
substantive moral claim that debunkers rely on to provide us with evidence of distortion: the
argument would be self-defeating.
Debunkers might object that there are cases in which we can legitimately rely on substantive
truths about the beliefs that we seek to debunk. Consider the following case21:
Suppose I provide you with evidence that your car’s thermometer is distorted by the heat
of the car’s engine: ‘Your car thermometer displayed +7 degrees, but it was -5!’ After
receiving this information, you ought to doubt all future readings of your car thermom-
eter because it might be distorted at any given moment.
In cases like the thermometer case, where a particular belief-producing faculty is being
debunked, we can rely on our knowledge about the truth in question: we have no reason to
assume that our beliefs about the temperature are unreliable. However, the debunking case is
not analogous. The debunkers’ ‘fact-checking’ of the moral truth is called into question by
their own argument. They attempt to debunk moral cognition entirely, and thus cannot rely on
beliefs that are safeguarded from the potentially debunking information. Hence, debunkers
18 Street’s terminology about ‘distorting’ causal influences on our moral beliefs may be partly responsible for this
myth (Street 2006: 155). Street uses ‘distorting‘in a weak sense, in which case there is only a non-truth-tracking
but no truth-tracking force present. This is suggested by her Bermuda analogy: setting out by boat for Bermuda
and letting the wind and tides determine one’s course is not clever because, without using the sail and the rudder,
the wind and waves do not push you to your target (Street 2006: 121–122). However, at this point in the dialectic
debunkers have to assume that correction is possible and thus understand distortion in a strong sense: a non-truth-
tracking force distorts even though a truth-tracking force might be present, too. Examples of this kind of
distortion are the forces of waves that erode a cliff or the winds at Cape Horn that push a capable sailor off
his intended course.
19 Which would be an instance of the Benacerraf-Field challenge.
20 ‘Global’ is also used by Kahane (2011) and Shafer-Landau (2012).
21 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection by suggesting this case.
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cannot rely on their own moral beliefs in the debunking argument; to avoid self-defeat they must
stay agnostic about the moral truth.22 However, in that case, their global debunking argument
does not work because, without evidence of distorted, false moral beliefs (via a substantive moral
claim) or evidence of the absence of possible corrective influence (via the Benacerraf-Field
challenge) we do not get sufficient reason to doubt the truth of all of our moral beliefs.
Second, while this particular problem can be avoided by attempting to debunk only
particular moral beliefs, that strategy fails, too, because the inference to DOUBT would fail:
we cannot infer sufficient reason to doubt all our moral beliefs from the falsity of one particular
belief. The scope of the debunking argument would be drastically reduced.
Take the example of a xenophobe who believes that all non-group members must be killed. A
plausible causal explanation of this belief might be the xenophobe’s evolved tendency to distin-
guish between members of his in-group and members of the out-group (cf. Wielenberg 2014):
XEN-INFLUENCE: The belief that all non-group members must be killed was influenced
by evolutionary forces.
To show that the cauasl influence reported in XEN-INFLUENCE is distorting, despite the
possibility that moral beliefs non-causally track moral properties, we need to point out that it is
not, in fact, the case that all non-group members must be killed.
Now we have evidence of a causal influence on the xenophobic belief and evidence that the
belief is false. In the case of the xenophobe, debunkers might claim, CORRECT evidently
faltered. But this is no victory for debunkers: they cannot infer DOUBT from the falsity of
one particular moral belief. The same holds if debunkers substitute the particular xenophobic
belief with subsets of moral beliefs, say all deontological beliefs, to increase the impact of their
argument (cf. Greene 2008). They could argue:
DEONTOLOGY-INFLUENCE: All deontological moral beliefs are influenced by such-and-such
causal forces.
But, again, the argument is limited in scope: it targets only a specific subset of moral beliefs,
distinguished by its content or by its origin, but not all moral beliefs as in the desired ‘global’
debunking argument. The best that can be hoped for is an inference to doubt the truth of those
beliefs that are part of particular subsets. So, ‘going local’ does not afford the desired inference
to DOUBT and ‘going global’ puts the required substantive moral assumption into jeopardy.
Moreover, there is an issue with substantive moral assumptions even on the local level. It
appears that causal considerations are, yet again, superfluous. We saw, for instance, that
premises with substantive moral content, like NOT-XEN, are crucial for inferring sufficient
reason to doubt the truth of particular moral beliefs, or subsets of moral beliefs. However, in
that case, the substantive moral claim seems to do the debunking, not the factual claim about
the genealogy of the beliefs in question.
For instance, suppose that I try to debunk moral beliefs that are moderated by disgust,
which would involve an empirical claim about the subset of all moral beliefs moderated by
disgust (cf. Sauer 2012). However, the sole fact that these beliefs are moderated by disgust
should not bother us in the least. We should be bothered only when we are convinced that
moral beliefs moderated by disgust are often false. However, disgust-moderated moral beliefs
22 Shafer-Landau (2012), who distinguishes between agnostic and knowledge-based EDAs.
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are not false because they are influenced by disgust; they are false because disgust in itself
seems morally irrelevant.
Hence, what counts in an attempt to debunk all disgust-moderated beliefs is the substantive
moral judgement about the causal influence in question, not evidence of the causal factor itself.
But if we already know that all disgust-related moral beliefs are false then it seems that howwe
came to have these beliefs is irrelevant for our verdict about them.
Therefore, the evolutionary, causal debunking argument against robust moral realism fails.
An evolutionary argument on the global level, which would affect all moral beliefs, relies on
substantive moral assumptions that are called into question by the debunkers’ very own
argument. The argument would be self-defeating. A ‘local’ argument that affects only particular
moral beliefs, or subsets of moral beliefs, does not warrant an inference to DOUBTand is thus of
a limited scope. Moreover, since the local argument relies on substantive moral assumptions,
too, it is, yet again, doubtful whether the empirical premises play an important role after all.
5 Conclusion
Street’s EDA is ‘old wine in new bottles’: it lacks an essential Darwinian causal premise and
relies on the Benacerraf-Field challenge, in which case it does not pose a novel, Darwinian
challenge for robust moral realism. Construing the argument with an essential empirical
premise leads is self-defeating or leads to a limited scope. Therefore, there is no evolutionary
debunking argument against robust moral realism.
Old wine need not be foul; the debunker might well be content with stating a brushed-up
version of the Benacerraf-Field challenge. In that case, however, the reference to empirical,
Darwinian considerations is reduced to an illustrative veneer that is ultimately redundant to
reaching the argument’s conclusion. The implication is that we should readjust focus in the
metaethical debunking debate: considering the causal history of our moral beliefs, in defence
of realism or in criticism against it, is simply beside the point when considering the possibility
of knowledge of objective moral facts.
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